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The vote to remain in the UK, in the Scottish independence 
referendum in 2014, did not settle the matter. Nor did it harm 
the fortunes of the pro-independence party, the Scottish 
National Party (SNP). Instead, its popularity has risen 
remarkably, and major constitutional change remains high 
on the agenda, particularly during the run up to a referendum 
on the UK’s exit from the EU. This continued fascination with 
the constitution overshadows the day-to-day business of 
Scottish politics. I highlight one aspect in particular: the 
tendency for limited public and parliamentary scrutiny of 
substantive policy issues when they are viewed through a 
constitutional rather than a substantive policy lens, 
producing an image of weak accountability. The aim of this 
chapter is to 
• Explain why the SNP’s popularity is remarkable. 
• Note that none of us have predicted it – or indeed much 
of the short history of devolution - too well, and use this 
point as a cautionary tale. 
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• Describe why independence is not inevitable, even 
though it often seems likely. 
• Shoehorn in some analysis of the links between our 
fascination with the constitution and the more humdrum 
world of actual policy.  
• Provide a brief update on the impact of the EU 
referendum, bearing in mind that I am just as hopeless as 
anyone else about predicting the future. 
 
The Remarkable Popularity of the SNP 
The SNP’s popularity is remarkable. Scottish Labour had 
dominated Westminster and local elections in Scotland for 
decades before the first Scottish Parliament election in 1999 
– it also won a plurality of European Parliament seats, but 
with far lower margins. Labour won most Scottish seats in 
every election from 1959-2010. In 1997, it won 46 per cent of 
the vote and 56 (78 per cent) of 72 Scottish Westminster seats 
(Cairney and McGarvey 2013, 45). The SNP won 22 per cent 
of the vote and 6 (8 per cent) seats. A similar pattern 
continued until 2010: Labour dominated Scottish 
Westminster seats even when the SNP began to win 
Holyrood elections. In the elections for the Scottish 
Parliament, its 44 per cent of the vote translated into 613 (53 
per cent) of 1155 seats in 1995, and it remained the largest 
party until 2007 (Cairney and McGarvey 2013, 51). 
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This dominance produced an expectation that Scottish 
Labour would become the largest party in the Scottish 
Parliament for the foreseeable future. In that context, the 
fortunes of Labour and the SNP changed remarkably quickly. 
In 1999 and 2003, the main limit to Labour dominance was 
the electoral system: it won the majority of constituency 
seats comfortably but few regional seats and it also won most 
constituency seats in 2007. By 2011, this position had 
reversed and, by 2016, the regional list was the only thing 
standing between Scottish Labour and electoral oblivion.  
In contrast, by 2011 the SNP achieved a majority of Scottish 
Parliament seats because the regional element of the mixed-
member proportional system (56 of 129 seats) was not large 
enough to offset SNP dominance of constituency seats. This 
is a remarkable outcome if we accept the well-shared story 
that Holyrood’s electoral system was ‘chosen by Labour to 
stop the SNP ever the getting the majority it needed to push 
hard on the independence agenda’ (Cairney 2011, 28). 
It is also remarkable that the SNP’s popularity did not dip 
after the 2014 referendum. You could be forgiven for thinking 
that a No vote in the referendum on Scottish independence 
would damage the SNP (Cairney 2015). If it is a single issue 
party, and most voters rejected its position on the issue, 
wouldn’t you expect it to suffer? Yet, here is what happened 
instead: its membership rocketed, from 25,000 to 75,000 in 
two weeks, then to 115,000 by 2016; it won 56 of 59 
Westminster seats in Scotland (2015) on the back of 50 per 
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cent of the vote; and it won a third Holyrood election in a row, 
only missing out narrowly on a second majority in a row, in a 
Mixed Member Proportional system. 
This is not so remarkable if you know that the SNP is not a 
single issue party. Instead, it is a highly professional 
organisation which has won elections on the back of valence 
politics as well as identity. The SNP did well in 2007 (Johns et 
al. 2009), and very well in 2011, because ‘most voters thought 
that the party would do a better job in office than its rivals’ 
(Johns et al. 2013). People vote for a party when they respect 
its leader, its vision for the future, and have a high 
expectation of its competence while in office – and the SNP 
has benefited from being a party that looks highly 
professional (although one’s belief in the competence of the 
SNP may be linked strongly to one’s national identify and 
support for independence). 
So, (a) it is worth noting that the SNP is doing well partly 
because 45 per cent of the vote will not win you a referendum, 
but it (plus a bit more) will do very nicely in a not-super-
proportional election system, but (b) there is far more to the 
SNP’s story than a translation of national identity into 
support for independence. 
You will always find someone who claims that they predicted 
these developments correctly, but that is because of the 
immense number and range of hyperbolic predictions – from 
the claim that devolution provided a ‘stepping stone’ to 
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independence (Dalyell 2009), to the claim that it would kill 
nationalism ‘stone dead’ – rather than the predictability of 
politics. So, for example, in retrospect we can say that 
devolution provided an important new platform for the SNP 
(Johns et al. 2010), but at the time we did not know that it 
would use this platform so effectively from the mid-2000s. 
Similarly, maybe some people in the future will look back to 
argue that Scottish independence was inevitable, but without 
being able to predict the detailed mechanisms of decisions 
and events. 
 
Scottish Independence is Not Inevitable (Even 
Though it Often Seems Likely) 
Before the Brexit vote, I tried to sell the idea that 10 years is 
the magic figure between Scottish referendums (2014 and 
2024): a short enough distance to keep pro-independence 
actors content, and long enough to hope that enough people 
have changed their minds. In the meantime, the SNP and 
Greens would produce some vague triggers, like a surge in 
opinion poll support. 
Now, if a second referendum is to happen, it is because of the 
constitutional crisis prompted by Brexit. Overall, most UK 
voters chose to leave the European Union, but most voters in 
Scotland chose to remain. The SNP and its allies will push for 
a second referendum on that basis, with reference to a 
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‘democratic outrage’. It possesses the votes to pass a bill to 
that effect in the Scottish Parliament, and needs some 
cooperation from a UK Government led by the party that just 
used a referendum to justify major constitutional change. It is 
difficult to see why the Conservative Government would 
oppose a referendum under those circumstances – rather 
than allow it to take place and argue for the Union – even 
though UK government ministers have rejected the idea so 
far. 
If a second referendum happens, it could happen before 
2020. I am hesitant to say when exactly, partly because there 
is so much uncertainty, which too many people try to fill with 
needless speculation. For example, Sturgeon confirmed that 
it could happen as early as 2017, but only because the BBC 
asked her what she would do if the UK Government behaved 
unreasonably.  In the same interview, Sturgeon also 
suggested that it may take a long time for the UK to invoke 
Article 50, which triggers a notional two-year negotiation 
period before the UK leaves the EU.  
Before we know if a second referendum is likely, and the likely 
date, we need clarity on two things: first, the extent to which 
the UK can, and is willing to, negotiate a deal with the EU 
which satisfies the SNP and Scottish voters – by becoming 
Brexit-lite or providing Scotland-specific provisions on key 
issues like the free movement of people; and second, the 
timing of Brexit, since a Scottish referendum would hopefully 
not take place until we know what we are voting for – which 
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might not happen until near the end of the notional two-year 
negotiations. Still, it is likely that the vote would be binary, as 
some version of: stay in the UK out of the EU, or leave the UK 
and stay in the EU. 
Dissatisfaction with devolution is not the same as support for 
independence. Recent events reinforce the sense that 
Scottish devolution will never seem like a ‘settlement’. 
Instead, until recently, we have had a routine process in 
which: (a) there is a proposed devolution settlement, (b) it 
sticks for a while, (c) there is a rise in support for 
independence or further devolution, and (d) there is another 
settlement.  
So far, this has happened in 1999, the first modern 
settlement, from the SNP’s first Holyrood win in 2007 
producing the Scotland Act 2011, and during the referendum 
itself producing the Scotland Act 2016. The difference this 
time is the sense – often generated by supporters and 
opponents of independence – that the 2016 Act is the final 
offer. If so, before Brexit, we had two key scenarios: first, this 
offer proves to be too unpopular to maintain support for 
devolution, there is a further referendum, and no-one can 
offer more devolution in exchange for a No vote. Second, the 
2016 Act finally helps address the idea of a ‘democratic 
deficit’ in which (a) most people in Scotland vote for one party 
in a UK general election – usually Labour, now SNP – but get 
another – often Conservative, and (b) this problem helps 
produce the sense that the UK Government is imposing 
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unpopular policies on Scotland. For the new act to work, you 
would need to generate the widespread sense, among the 
public, that a Scottish Government could choose to mitigate 
the effects of a UK Government, perhaps without raising 
taxes. 
Now, things are a bit more complicated, since devolution is 
no longer simply about Scotland’s position in the UK. 
Scenario two now has to be accompanied by the sense, 
however true, that the Scottish Government is able to 
negotiate a distinctive relationship with the EU while 
remaining in the UK. 
 
What Happens in the Meantime? The Humdrum 
World of Scrutiny and Policy-Making 
In the meantime, Scottish politics exhibits an unusual twist on 
the usual tale of Westminster politics. We have the familiar 
disconnection between two understandings of politics, in 
which (a) we use elections and some parliamentary scrutiny 
to praise or blame governments, but also (b) recognise the 
limits to central control, which undermine a meaningful sense 
of accountability. This confusion is complicated by 
devolution and ‘multi-level governance’ in which we are not 
always sure about which level of government is responsible 
for which policy – although Brexit will remove a level from 
many of those relationships! The 2016 Act, in which there are 
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many new shared responsibilities between the Scottish and 
UK Governments, adds complexity and confusion to the 
settlement. So, politicians tell very different stories about 
what the Scottish Government can do, who is in charge, and 
who should take the blame for policy outcomes. Moreover, 
the Scottish Parliament continues to struggle to know how 
best to try to hold the Scottish Government to account and it 
might soon struggle a bit more. 
Perhaps one possible exception is the new debate on 
educational attainment. First Minister Nicola Sturgeon 
staked a large part of her reputation on reducing the gap in 
attainment between students in the most and least deprived 
areas of Scotland. Before the election, she promised to ‘close 
the attainment gap completely’. Although the SNP 
manifesto in 2016 presents more equivocal language, 
reflecting the sense that it does not know how much it can 
reduce the gap, it remains significant as an issue in which 
there are constitutional complications. The Scottish 
Government does not control fully the economic and social 
security ‘levers’ affecting levels of deprivation, but the SNP is 
not using them to qualify its aims. This example supplements 
several ongoing debates of high party political importance, in 
which there is not a constitutional element on, for example, 
the Scottish Government’s ‘named person’ policy and 
legislation on ‘offensive behaviour’ in relation to football. 
Maybe such cases suggest that, for at least the next few 
years, we will pretend that there is a Scottish devolution 
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settlement and that we are not just killing time until the next 
referendum. This, however, already seems like an out of date 
hope. The constitution is back at the top of our agenda, and I 
cannot remember the last time I read a story about domestic 
policy in Scotland. 
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